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9.1 Introduction
The effect of capital structure on firm value has been a subject of
controversy over the years. Most early work, such as Modigliani and
Miller (1958), showed that when capital markets are perfect and invest-
ment policy is fixed, capital structure is irrelevant to firm value. Later
studies (Modigliani and Miller 1963; Baxter 1967) introduced corporate
taxes and/or bankruptcy costs in an effort to explain capital structure.
The tax/bankruptcy arguments have been extended by Miller (1977), who
showed that with personal taxes there is no corporate advantage to
leverage, and DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), who hypothesized that the
extent of nondebt tax shields determines a firm's optimal capital struc-
ture. Recently there has been a movement away from the traditional
tax-bankruptcy cost argument toward a consideration of agency costs as
the major determinant of financial leverage. Jensen and Meckling (1976)
showed that with risky debt outstanding, a firm's investment policy is not
fixed. Myers (1977) first recognized the underinvestment problem by
noting that shareholders of firms with risky debt will invest only when (or
up to the point at which) the expected return on investment is at least as
great as the promised payment to bondholders. When the expected
return is less than the promised payment, shareholders fail to exercise the
investment option (or invest less than the optimal amount), which re-
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duces firm value. It is this decline in firm value which limits the amount of
debt a given firm can issue.
Myers(1977) correctly identifies investment opportunities, including,
for example, the maintenance of equipment, as leading to potential
underinvestment. He notes that owners, by devising complex debt con-
tracts, can reduce the effect of potential underinvestment and induce
bondholders to pay a higher price for debt. But debt contracts can be
effective only when the firm's investment opportunity set is observable.
In this study we show that because intangible, firm-specific, and there-
fore unobservable growth opportunities reduce the effectiveness of bond
covenants, the only way in which owners of firms with a high proportion
of intangible investment opportunities can control the agency costs of
debt is by limiting the amount of risky debt outstanding. Conversely, this
implies that if a firm's investment opportunities consist primarily of
tangible assets, such as capital equipment, they can always support a
greater level of debt.
The same arguments apply to the asset substitution problem (Black
and Scholes 1973; Smith and Warner 1979). While riskier (more capital-
intensive) equipment can always be purchased, such investments are
observable. With intangible investments, it is a relatively easy matter for
owners to increase firm risk without bondholders' being aware of the shift
for many years. For example, a firm can concentrate its research and
development (R&D) on projects with a low probability of extremely high
returns. Since most firms closely guard information concerning R&D
projects, this type of risk shifting is difficult for outsiders to detect.
Thus our major conclusion is that it is the type of investment opportu-
nities facing the firm which determines financial leverage. The empirical
evidence supports this conclusion.
Our analysis of the effect on investment type on corporate leverage
proceeds as follows. In section 9.2 we develop a model showing the cause
and effect of underinvestment and asset substitution. We then analyze
the differing effects which investments in tangible or intangible assets
have on firm value and present our hypothesis. Section 9.3 describes our
sample and the variables used to characterize investment alternatives,
and presents our empirical results. Included are tests incorporating addi-
tional variables suggested by other researchers. Finally, we present and
discuss the implications of our findings in section 9.4.
9.2 Investment Choice and Financial Leverage: Theory
In this section we analyze the underinvestment and asset substitution
problems as they relate to the type of investment opportunities facing a
firm. We show that because investments in tangible assets, such as capital327 Investment Patterns and Financial Leverage
equipment, can be observed, firms with a high proportion of tangible
investment opportunities can always support more debt than firms facing
intangible, or firm-specific, opportunities. It is these difficult to observe
firm-specific investments which provide true economic growth and at the
same time reduce financial leverage.
We examine investment-related agency problems by considering a firm
which operates for three periods, t = 0,1,2, in an economy characterized
by state-contingent claims which promise to pay $1.00 in period t, if and
only if state St occurs. Capital markets are perfect so that there are no
taxes or transactions costs. However, there are agency costs related to
risky debt. It is assumed that some debt is advantageous because of
offsetting agency costs of equity and that these costs have been minimized
so that managers act on behalf of owners. The firm starts out at t = 0 with
initial equity capitalization, an initial asset base, and a set of investment
opportunities which can be exercised at t = 1. The investments which are
accepted will provide earnings at t = 2 which depend both on the state of
nature and the level of investment. At the end of t = 2, the value of the
investments is zero, that is, they are fully depreciated. The following
notations are used throughout the paper.
Ci = Amount invested in period 1.
qo(St) = Value at t = 0 of a claim for $1.00 to be delivered in period t,
if and only if state St occurs, t = 1, 2; S = 0, ...,...,.
^1(^2) = Expected (or implied) value at t = 1 of a claim for $1.00 to
be delivered in period 2, if and only if state S2 occurs and
qi(S2) = qo(S2) I qo{S\) •
Z = The unlevered firm's investment problem at t = 1.
Z' = The levered firm's investment problem at t — 1.
V = Value of the unlevered firm.
V = Value of the levered firm.
Ve = Value of equity when there is no risky debt.
Ve' - Value of equity when there is risky debt.
P = Promised payment to bondholders at t = 2.
Vd = Value of the firm's debt at t = 0.
B = Price paid for the firm's debt at t = 0.
Sd2 = State below which operating default occurs at t — 2.
Sb2 = State below which financial default occurs at t = 2.
R(CX, S2) = Dollar return on investment at t = 2, where
dR(Cl9 S2) I 3d > 0, d
2R(Clt S2) I dCf < 0.
It is assumed that the firm derives some level of expected earnings at
t = 1 from the initial asset base. However, for simplicity, we assume that
there is no probability of operating default at t = 1 so that these expected
earnings, which are the same for an unlevered or levered firm, are
ignored in the analyses which follow.328 Michael S. Long/Ileen B. Malitz
9.2.1 The Underinvestment Problem
Consider first the choice of the level of investment for the unlevered
firm. At t = 1, owners will maximize their wealth.
(1) max Z = - Q + rSd2 R{CU S2) qi(S2)dS2 .
This of course equals the net present value (NPV) of the investment to
the firm at t = 1. The first-order condition for equation (1) leads to the
classic microeconomic result: Invest to the point, C*, where the expected
marginal return on investment equals its marginal cost.
(2) dZ/dC, = - 1 + nd2 [d*(d*, 52)/dd]
qi(S2)dS2 = 0.
This is equivalent to investing in all projects with a NPV > 0. The value of
the firm equals the owners wealth in the firm, and is optimal at this point.
(3) V=Ve=-C1*JZq0{S1)ds1
+ fond2R(C1*,S2)qo(S2)dS2.
Now assume that instead of remaining all equity funded at t = U, owners
issue debt which promises to pay an amount P at t — 2. The debt is pure
discount so that the amount paid, B, reflects anticipated payment at t =
2. Owners use these proceeds to repurchase equity at t — 0, and fund C1
by issuing new equity at t = 1. At t = 2, owners default on debt if the
return is less than the promised payment, R(C1, S2) < P, which occurs in
all states S2 < Sb2. Thus at t = 1, when maximizing their wealth, owners
recognize that they receive a return if and only if S2 > Sb2.
(4) max Z' = - d + J1M [*(d, S2) - P] q1(S2)dS2 .
Equation (4) leads to a first-order condition, and thus a level of invest-
ment C[, which does not maximize firm value.
(5) 3Z73d = - 1 + Fsb2 [BR(C\, S2)/dC1]
qi(S2)dS2.
The second term in equation (5) is less than the corresponding term in
equation (2) because Sb2 > Sd2. Because owners only receive payoffs
after they have paid bondholders, they invest less than the optimal
amount, C < C*. The value of equity is then the present value of the
shareholders' portion of firm value.
(6) Ve'= -C1JS
>q0(S1)dS1
+ fo rSb2 [R(C[, S2) - P] qo(S2)dS2.329 Investment Patterns and Financial Leverage
Since the proceeds from the sale of debt are distributed to owners, their
wealth depends on the price paid for debt. This in turn depends on the
ability of potential bondholders to accurately assess owners' investment
decisions, which requires knowledge of the firm's investment opportunity
set.
Suppose first that potential bondholders do not anticipate underinvest-
ment; that is, they assume C[ = C*. Then the price they are willing to pay
reflects the investments they assume the firm will undertake.
(7)
+
Because they assume C* is invested, they also assume that the default
state, Sb2* is lower than its actual state, Sb2. This results in a wealth loss
equal to the price paid for the bonds less the true value of debt (B - Vd).
This loss is shown graphically on figure 9.1. Bondholders priced debt as
if they would receive the present value of area OABCSN. However, debt
is actually worth the present value of area OA'B'CSN. The bondholders
overpaid (and transferred to owners) an amount equal to the present
value of the shaded area, AA'BB'. The effect on owners' wealth depends
on whether the gain from bondholders exceeds the decline in the value of
A'
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Fig. 9.1 The effect of unanticipated underinvestment on bondholder
wealth.330 Michael S. Long Heen B. Malitz
equity (area BB' DD'). If owners could underinvest without bondholders
anticipating their actions, they would increase their wealth.
But in a rational capital market, bondholders will attempt to anticipate
underinvestment. If the firm's investment opportunities are tangible in
nature, potential bondholders are able to estimate the investment oppor-
tunity set and thus fully anticipate the lower level of investment. They will
then pay the true value of debt so that B = Vd.




The value of debt is equal to the present value of the promised payment in
states of no default plus the present value of the firm in states of default on
debt. In this case, when B is distributed to owners, the value of the
levered firm is less than that of the unlevered firm.
(9) r=-C1
+ JoFsd2R(C1,S2)qo(S2)dS2.
As long as bondholders accurately anticipate underinvestment, owners
bear a loss in firm value which increases with the amount promised to
bondholders. Then it is to the owner's advantage to provide monitoring
of investment decisions. Whether monitoring of investment decisions is
provided by bondholders (through debt covenants) or by the capital
market itself (implicit monitoring), much of the negative effect of risky
debt can be eliminated. Low-growth firms with tangible, generalized
investment opportunities, such as plant and equipment, can support
more debt because of the ability of potential bondholders to estimate
underinvestment and to observe and monitor investment decisions.
But suppose that the firm's investment opportunities are intangible
and/or firm specific in nature so that potential bondholders are unable to
estimate either the firm's investment opportunities or the extent of under-
investment. Then normally they will assume the worst possible case,
which in the limit is zero investment. While owners could promise higher
payments to bondholders in order to induce them to purchase debt,
Myers has shown that increasing P is not effective. Because firm value
declines as the promised payment increases, beyond some point, called
the firm's debt capacity, increasing P reduces rather than increases the
value of debt. Further, if bondholders are unable to estimate underin-
vestment, they are also unable to observe or monitor the firm's invest-
ment policy. Thus the effectiveness of either bond convenants or implicit
capital market monitoring is reduced. Since the market cannot effectively
monitor investment decisions, it instead limits the amount of debt. Be-
cause high-growth firms cannot be effectively monitored, they will have
lower financial leverage.331 Investment Patterns and Financial Leverage
9.2.2 Asset Substitution
Consider the investment decision as it concerns the risk of the assets
purchased. It is well known that increasing firm risk may decrease bond-
holder wealth while increasing owners wealth. We examine this problem
by assuming that the firm faces a second set of investments at t = 1, C'[
with a return function at t = 2 of R"(C'{, S2). To highlight the asset
substitution problem, we assume that C'[ — C[ so that owners maximize
their wealth at the same level of investment. The new set of investments is
riskier, implying that Sb2 < Sb2, Sd2 < Sd2, and
s RyLi, b2)qi\d2)ad2>J sd2 K \^i-> ^2)^1 W2)"^2
Hb2 R{C\, S2)qi(S2)dS2 = rsbTR"(C[, S2)qi(S2)dS2.
These patterns of return are shown graphically on figure 9.2. The second
set of investments results in a higher probability of operating default as
well as a higher probability of financial default. Figure 9.2 shows that the
expected marginal return on the original investment over states S2 ^ Sb2
(area Sb2A' CSN) is equal to the expected marginal return on the riskier
investment over states S2 > Sb2" (area Sb2» B' C SN). This leads to identic- al first-order conditions for owners' wealth maximization and thus to the
same level of investment. Figure 9.2 also shows that the expected margin-






Fig. 9.2 Expected marginal returns on investment with asset substitu-
tion.332 Michael S. Long Ileen B. Malitz
exceeds the expected marginal return on the riskier investment over
states S2 ^ Sd2" (area Sd2"BC SN). Thus, given the above assumptions, the first-order conditions to maximize firm value shows that the less risky
investment is preferable.
1
The value of equity with the original investment is given by equation
(6). The value of equity, Ve", with the riskier investment depends on the
returns to owners in states S2 ^ Sb2".
(10) Ve=-C[foqo(S1)dS1
+ Jo" rSbT [R"(C[, S2) - P] qo(S2)dS2.
If the riskier investment is chosen, the value of equity changes as follows:
(11) Ve" - Ve' = Jo !sbr [R"(C\, S2) - R' {C\, S2)]
qo(S2)dS2
~ Jo Isb2 [R' (C'i, S2) - P]qo(S2)dS2.
The first term in (11) is the difference in value of the two investments in
states of no default on debt and is positive by assumption. The second
term is negative, since owners do not default on debt in states S2 ^ Sb2 if
they choose the original investment. The value of equity may increase if
the riskier investment is chosen. Whether or not it does depends on the
promised payment to bondholders.
As with underinvestment, if bondholders did not anticipate investment
substitution, they would assume that the original investment would be
chosen and would be willing to pay




But the actual value of debt, given the riskier investment, is




The price paid for debt exceeds its actual value. This is shown graphically
on figure 9.3. The price paid by bondholders is the present value (PV) of
area OABCSN. The true value of debt is the PV of area OB' CSN. The
overpayment (wealth loss) is the PV of area OABB'. This amount is
transferred to owners. In addition owners gain the difference between the
PVs of area DEF and area BB'D. Finally, firm value declines by the
difference between shareholders' gain and bondholders' loss (PV of areas
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Fig. 9.3 The effect of unanticipated asset substitution on bondholder
wealth.
But again, in a rational market the amount paid for debt equals its true
expected value; B = Vd, so that any potential loss in firm value is borne
by owners. If bondholders have reason to suspect that owners will move
toward riskier investments, the price of debt will be discounted in the
capital market. In the extreme, investors may anticipate losses so great
that additional debt will not be purchased at any promised payment.
Again, it is intangible investment which leads to the problem. When a
firm invests in capital equipment, it is relatively simple to estimate the
owner's incentives to substitute riskier investments and to observe their
contribution to firm risk. This means that it is more likely that bond-
holders can accurately anticipate asset substitution.
2 But when a firm
faces many firm-specific investment opportunities, it is a relatively simple
matter for owners to increase firm risk over time. Because of the intangi-
ble nature of these investments, market participants often have difficulty
estimating their risk and return. Further, since the ultimate effect of
increasing the risk of intangible investments may not be known for
several years, it is almost impossible for bondholders or the capital
market to monitor such investments. For these reasons, we hypothesize
that firms with a high proportion of value due to intangible investment
opportunities can support less debt than those whose value depends on
tangible assets.334 Michael S. Long/Ileen B. Malitz
9.3 Empirical Results
We test our hypothesis that a firm's choice of capital depends on the
type of investment opportunities it faces by examining the cross-sectional
behavior of firms during the period 1978-80.
Our primary source of data is the COMPUSTAT Annual Industrial
File. All manufacturing firms (SIC four-digit classification 2000-3999)
which contained a full set of data for 1978-80 were considered as our
initial sample.
3 Additional data were obtained from the CRSP Daily
Return Tape. This limited our sample to firms listed on either the New
York (NYSE) or American Stock Exchange (AMEX). Our final sample
consists of 545 firms of which 139 are in the Standard and Poor 500, 216
are non-Standard and Poor 500 NYSE firms, and 190 are listed on the
AMEX. We require two sets of variables: those measuring financial
leverage and those measuring the type of investment opportunities.
Measuring financial leverage is relatively straightforward. Our pre-
vious analysis suggests that firms will choose a capital structure which
reflects the type of investment opportunities they face. However, it is well
known that firms do not instantaneously adjust their financing mix to
reflect changes in underlying characteristics. Rather, the issue or retire-
ment of debt occurs at fixed points in time as the firm adjusts to its target
debt ratio. Thus, the average stock of debt outstanding during any period
of time should provide a better indication of a firm's target capital
structure than changes in the level of debt. In addition, since our hypoth-
esis centers on the effect of long-term investments on the firm's financing
decisions, we wish to consider only long-term, funded debt.
4 We thus
measure financial leverage as the book value of all long-term, funded
debt.
5
When considering the effect of investment type on financial leverage,
we must devise measures which capture the realization that firms raise
capital prior to funding investments. This implies that our investment
measures should be current flows rather than stocks.
6 In addition, we
must recognize that, as Myers (1977) pointed out, all investments are
discretionary in nature and thus may lead to agency problems. But we
hypothesize that it is only firm-specific, intangible investment opportuni-
ties that reduce the firm's debt capacity and thus their financial leverage.
Because all investments provide some growth in the firm's assets, we
need variables which distinguish between growth due merely to expan-
sion (NPV = 0) and true economic growth (NPV > 0). True economic
growth results from a firm's ability to select investments which create a
unique product or process. Two such investments for which there are
readily available data are R&D and advertising. To capture the flow of
funds into alternative investments, we use the firm's reported R&D and
advertising expenditures as our proxies for firm-specific, intangible in-335 Investment Patterns and Financial Leverage
vestments and the firm's reported capital expenditures to measure expan-
sionary or tangible investments.
All of the above variables, financial leverage, R&D, advertising, and
capital expenditures, are measured using accounting data. Because there
is a large variation in the size of firms, a direct comparison of these
variables is impossible. To standardize our measures, we use a size-
related denominator and compute ratios. Since we are primarily in-
terested in how firms have raised capital to fund their mix of investments,
we seek a standardizing variable which reflects invested capital. We
define invested capital as the book values of long-term debt and equity.
We then modify this measure by recognizing that there are several
categories of capital, such as R&D and advertising, which, because of the
difficulty in measuring future benefits, are currently required by GAAP
to be expensed. The expensing, rather than the capitalization, of these
items is in contrast to the treatment of tangible assets, which are capital-
ized initially and then depreciated. Because the items which are expensed
are precisely those which we hypothesize can support little debt, we
adjust our denominator by adding capitalized advertising and R&D. We
assume a five-year life for R&D, a three-year life for advertising, and
straight-line amortization. Because the use of capitalized R&D and
advertising reduces the financial leverage variable for firms with higher
such expenditures, there is a potential bias in our results. For this reason,
we examine alternative standardizing variables: total assets and invested
capital (without capitalized R&D and advertising). To control for any
unusual conditions which might affect a variable at any point in time, we
average our ratios over a three-year period from 1978 through 1980.
We also wish to consider the effect of the firm's asset (operating) risk
on capital structure decisions. The traditional finance literature assumes
that operating and financial risk are offsetting decisions, so that firms with
greater operating risk will have lower financial leverage. By including a
measure of operating risk, we are better able to isolate the effects of
investment choice on financial leverage. We are interested in the firm's
systematic risk, or beta, which is assumed to capture all of its business or
asset risk. We first compute the firm's equity beta, using the geometric
average of 20 daily returns to approximate one month.
7 We then unlever
the beta as suggested by Hamada (1972) and Rubenstein (1973) using the
market value of equity and the book value of debt as a percentage of total
value to weight equity and debt, respectively. Because we assume debt is
riskless, our measure underestimates systematic risk for high-leverage
firms.
8 We include the unlevered beta as an independent variable in all
tests using individual firm data.
In addition, to completely neutralize a firm's underlying business risk,
we also form equal beta portfolios by first determining the median
unlevered beta. We then list all firms in decreasing order of financial336 Michael S. Long/Ileen B. Malitz
leverage and place them into one of two groups: those with unlevered
betas above the median and those with unlevered betas below the me-
dian. Next we place the first four firms in each group into a 8-firm
portfolio. We weight the portfolio so that its unlevered beta is equal to
the median beta. We continue the process until all firms are assigned to a
portfolio. This process, which creates 68 equal beta portfolios, each with
a different degree of financial leverage, greatly reduces the random
variation in our predictor variables. This reduction in variation can be
seen on table 9.1.
Table 9.1 shows that for each variable, the standard deviation is lower
when portfolio data are used. However, because the use of portfolios
results in a loss of data, all results are reported for both individual firms
and portfolios of firms. Our basic models of the predictors of financial
leverage are presented below.
(14) Leverage = Bo + Bx (advertising) + B2 (R&D)
+ B3 (capital expenditures)
(15) Leverage = 0^ + ^ (advertising) + C2 (R&D)
+ C3 (capital expenditures)
+ C4 (unlevered beta)
Equation (14) is the model used to test data for the 68 portfolios, while
equation (15) is used to test data for the 545 firms. Both models are tested
using ordinary least squares regression. Table 9.2 presents the results of
tests of equation (14) using the three alternative denominators discussed
above, while table 9.3 presents the results using firm data.
Table 9.2 shows that, depending on the denominator used, between
35% and 41% of the variation in debt is explained by investment type. In
each case, the signs are as predicted. The results using invested capital
plus capitalized R&D and advertising and those using totals assets are
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Table 9.2 Advertising, Research and Development and Capital'.









































Note: Absolute value of /-ratios in parentheses.
Table 9.3 Advertising, R&D, Capital Expenditures, and Unlevered Beta





















except that the significance of the advertising variable declines. Because
the results are similar, and because we feel that it is appropriate to
capitalize rather than expense R&D and advertising, all future tests will
use variables standardized by invested capital plus capitalized R&D and
advertising.
Table 9.3 shows that, for individual firms, systematic risk and invest-
ment type explain 21% of the variation in debt. Not surprisingly, the most
significant variable is systematic asset risk, with riskier firms having lower
financial leverage.
9 All variables measuring investment type have the
predicted sign and are statistically significant. Firms with discretionary
investment opportunities have lower financial leverage than those facing
tangible investments.
1
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We now wish to determine whether or not the above results indicate a
true moral hazard problem. It is possible that our results reflect spurious
correlation of our proxies for investment type with other, more important
determinants of financial leverage. We investigate this possibility by
examining the effect of variables suggested by other researchers on the
power of the model. These determinants include non-interest-related tax
shields, firm specific (unsystematic) risk, and the availability of internal
funds.
1
1 In addition, we examine whether or not agency problems affect
short-term borrowing decisions. Because several of our variables exhibit
multicollinearity, we examine the correlation matrices for both firms and
portfolios before presenting our results.
Tables 9.4 and 9.5 show that there is a high degree of multicollinearity
between capital expenditures and investment-related tax shields, which
might affect either the sign or interpretation of the tax variable. How-
ever, it is interesting to note that the tax shield is positively related to
long-term debt.
In addition, a comparison of tables 9.4 and 9.5 shows that when we
neutralize risk, advertising and R&D are positively correlated with oper-
ating cash flows. These correlations are not present in individual firm
data. Thus when we consider the effect of operating cash flow on the
power of the moral hazard model, we might expect different results for
the two sets of data. Table 9.4 also shows that while systematic and
unsystematic risk are positively correlated, their effect on debt is oppo-
site. With these relationships in mind, we now examine each variable
separately and determine its effect on the moral hazard model.
We first examine the effect of investment-related tax shields on the
power of our model. Expanding on Miller (1977), DeAngelo and Masulis
(1980) first suggested that a firm's financial leverage depends on the
availability of investment-related tax shields, such as depreciation and
investment tax credits. They show that when such tax shields are avail-
able, corporate capital structure is relevant to individual firms. They
argue that the presence of nondebt tax shields affects the extent to which
corporations can gain from the substitution of debt for equity. Since
higher financial leverage increases the probability that nondebt tax
shields will be lost, they hypothesize that firms with lower tax shields will
employ more debt in their capital structure. This implies that firms
investing heavily in capital equipment, which generates large tax shields,
should have less debt. We have already observed that the relationship
between capital expenditures and financial leverage is positive. However,
we wish to test the effect of tax shields directly. We compute the deprecia-
tion tax shield as depreciation expense times the corporate marginal tax
rate plus the change in deferred taxes. The total investment-related tax
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Note: Absolute value of ^-statistic in parentheses.
Table 9.6 presents the results of including the investment-related tax
shield in our model. We see that because of multicollinearity, the coef-
ficients are negative but insignificant. The coefficients of our moral
hazard variables remain as predicted, and all are significant. Thus while
we cannot exclude the possibility of tax effect, we can conclude that the
moral hazard problem remains and is important in determining financial
leverage.
We next turn to the question of whether or not a firm's total risk
influences its financial leverage. Agency theory contends that the higher
the variance of the firm's returns, the less the underinvestment problem.
Because investments which reduce firm risk provide a capital gain to
bondholders at the expense of shareholders, owners are likely to forgo
such investments. Conversely, because they hold claim to the upper
portion of a firm's distribution of return, shareholders are more likely
invest in high-variance projects. Thus, all other factors equal, high-
variance firms will lower agency costs of debt due to underinvestment and
thus higher financial leverage.
1
3 If, however, we consider the possibility
that bankruptcy costs matter, higher-variance firms would have less
debt.
1
4 Thus, if total risk has a positive effect on leverage, we assume that
the moral hazard problem outweighs the increased probability of bank-
ruptcy, and vice versa if the effect is negative. If both problems are
important, then they should offset each other and the effect of total risk
on financial leverage should be neutralized.
We measure total risk as the unsystematic, firm-specific, residual vari-
ance of the firm's stock returns, standardized by the market variance.
1
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Note: Absolute value of f-statistics in parentheses.
Table 9.7 shows that when using data for individual firms or portfolios,
unsystematic risk has a significantly positive effect on financial leverage.
We note that with firm data, the effect of unlevered beta on financial
leverage is negative. To attempt to determine the overall affect of risk,
we also used the firm's total variance of stock returns, unlevered to
remove the effect of debt. Our results showed that total risk also is
significantly positively correlated with financial leverage. This indicates
that control of underinvestment exerts a greater influence on debt capac-
ity than does the increased probability of bankruptcy. While we cannot
conclude that bankruptcy costs are irrelevant, we can state that inclusion
of risk measures does not affect the ability of the moral hazard variables
to explain financial leverage.
We next examine the possibility that the size of a firm's operating cash
flows determines financial leverage. There are two possible explanations
why cash flows might influence corporate borrowing.
First, as Donaldson (1961) noted, managers may prefer to minimize
their costs and constraints by using internally generated funds. This is
consistent with Miller's (1977) argument that with personal taxes and no
transactions costs firms are indifferent to capital structure. If we then
introduce transactions costs, we would expect that firms will choose the
form of financing which is least expensive. Therefore, firms with ade-
quate internal funds will provide most of their capital requirements
internally, while less liquid firms will be forced to resort to outside
funding.343 Investment Patterns and Financial Leverage
However, it is also possible that a firm's cash flows are a proxy for the
type of investment opportunities they face. In the absence of positive net
present valued investments, we would expect that if risk were held
constant, all firms would have the same before tax operating cash flows.
Any observed variation in cash flows can be attributed to variation in
economic growth. True economic growth results from a firm's ability to
select investments which create unique products or processes. When
investment opportunities are firm specific or intangible, they are more
likely to generate positive net present values and thus higher cash flows.
Thus it is possible that the size of a firm's cash flows is a proxy for
firm-specific investment opportunities instead of growth opportunities.
We measure operating cash flows as earnings before interest, deprecia-
tion and taxes. If either explanation is correct, we expect cash flow to
have a negative relationship with financial leverage.
Table 9.8 indicates that operating cash flow is indeed negatively related
to financial leverage. In the model using firm data, inclusion of cash flow
does not affect the explanatory power of the moral hazard variables.
However, since firms with higher systematic risk should have higher
profitability, we consider these results inconclusive. When we examine
the effect of cash flow when risk is neutralized, we see that the importance
of both advertising and R&D is reduced below statistical significance.
This is due to the previously noted high positive correlation among the
variables. There are three possible explanations for this phenomenon.
First, because our portfolios are ordered by financial leverage, it is
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possible that low leverage firms have high cash flows and independently
have high advertising and R&D expenditures. In this case, because cash
flows exert a stronger influence on leverage, the importance of advertis-
ing and R&D is reduced, but the variables do not proxy for each other. A
second possibility is that advertising and R&D create high cash flows and
therefore proxy for the availability of internal funds. Finally, it is possible
that cash flows are a proxy for all firm-specific investment opportunities,
including advertising and R&D.
While we cannot empirically distinguish among the alternative ex-
planations, it appears likely that the first is correct and the variables are
independent determinants of leverage. Because capital expenditures is
not strongly correlated with cash flows, it is still statistically significant.
Capital expenditures also measures the extent of moral hazard problems
and its inclusion in the model (after the influence of cash flows has been
considered) increases the explained variation in financial leverage by
25%. Thus, while we cannot explain the relationship between advertis-
ing, R&D, and cash flows, we can conclude that the moral hazard
problem is important.
Finally, we look at whether or not our basic model can explain a firm's
use of short-term sources of funds. If short-term borrowing is used in
order to resolve agency problems, advertising and R&D should exert a
positive effect. But if firms turn to short-term borrowing solely to finance
cyclical, short-term requirements, while choosing to finance longer-term
requirements by issuing long-term, funded debt, the effect of our vari-
ables on the level of short-term debt should be negligible. Table 9.9
shows the results of our basic model using short-term debt as our depen-
dent variable.
Table 9.9 shows that when we use firm data, advertising and capital
expenditures have a positive effect on short-term borrowing while R&D
has a negative effect. Our results with portfolio data are similar, except
that R&D does not enter the equation. In both cases, our explained
variation is extremely small. It appears as if firms make short-term
borrowing decisions independent of long-term investment requirements
and do not attempt to resolve agency problems by the substitution of
short-term for long-term debt.
9.4 Conclusions and Implications
We have shown that moral hazard problem, which affects a firm's
investment decisions, is a major determinant of corporate leverage.
Specifically, we developed a model in which a firm's financial leverage
depends on whether it invests in tangible, capital assets or in intangible,
firm-specific assets. We tested our model using both a large sample of345 Investment Patterns and Financial Leverage
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individual firms and 68 eight-firm portfolios formed to neutralize sys-
tematic operating risk. We were able to explain 21% of the variation for
individual firms and 41% of the variation when risk was held constant.
We then examined the robustness of our model by including various
variables which other researchers have suggested may influence financial
leverage. Our intent was not to prove or disprove alternative theories but
rather to determine the power of the moral hazard model. We found that
including investment-related tax shields or firm-specific risk did not affect
our results. When we included a variable measuring before-tax operating
cash flow, we found that two of our variables, advertising and R&D, did
lose power. While we were unable to determine precisely the relationship
among the variables, we did find evidence that they are independent
measures. It appears that while the availability of internal funds may be
the most important determinant of whether or not a firm seeks external
sources of funds, the moral hazard problem can still explain the choice of
debt or equity.
We conclude that a major factor which influences corporate leverage
decisions is the type of investments a firm undertakes. Given that a firm
must seek an outside source of funds, its choice between debt or equity
will depend in part on the magnitude of potential agency costs of debt.
Because of these costs, corporations which invest heavily in intangibles,
such as R&D and advertising, have a tighter capital market imposed debt
capacity than those investing in tangible assets. Our findings provide
direct empirical evidence that the moral hazard problem is important and
that investment and financing decisions are not independent.346 Michael S. Long/Ileen B. Malitz
Notes
1. The first-order conditions for the two investments are as follows:
(i) ~ 1 +/5d2 [dR(C[, S2)/dC[] qi(S2)dS2 = 0,
(ii) - 1 + S1dT [dR"(C[, S2)ldC[] q1(S2)dS2 = 0.
Since the second term in eq. (i) exceeds that of eq. (ii), when the level of investment is
constant the less risky investment is optimal for the firm. It can be shown (see Myers 1977)
that when the level of investment varies, the less risky investment may lead to greater
underinvestment, that is, area Sd2 A A' Sb2 may be greater than Sd2" BB' Sb2" on fig. 9.2. 2. For example, if alternative capital equipment with different contributions to operat-
ing risk is available, this is likely to be known and the effect of the riskier investment on debt
values can be anticipated. Or, if the shift in risk is accomplished by replacing existing
equipment, it is likely that the price paid for the equipment will approximate its true value.
Then all bondholders need be concerned about is that the expected NPV of the new
equipment is nonnegative.
3. When there were missing data, the values were collected from Moody's Industrial
Manual.
4. Myers (1977) has shown that because short-term debt is retired prior to investment
choice it does not affect owner's investment decisions. We examine this proposition later in
this paper.
5. We investigate the possibility that since agency problems can be circumvented either
by issuing convertible debt (Jensen and Meckling 1976) or by leasing the inclusion of these
items in our measure of debt may bias our results. However, when we remove convertible
debt and leases from our measure of financial leverage, we achieve identical results for both
the portfolios and individual firms.
6. The use of investment stocks would seriously bias our results. The stock of debt
reflects the current level of debt. The stock of investments reflects all previous investment
decisions, many of which were made prior to issuing any of the long-term debt which is
currently outstanding. The flow of funds into alternative investments adequately reflects the
use to which the funds raised from the sale of debt were put.
7. Betas are determined using 60 "months" of data where possible. Where 60 months
are not available less are used except that at least 36 "months" are required.
8. If debt is not riskless, our estimate underestimates the asset beta by a factor equal to
the firm's leverage ratio times its true debt beta. If we assume that debt of higher-leverage
firms has greater systematic risk, this underestimation is magnified.
9. This relationship is due in part to the negative bias in our computation of unlevered
beta for high-leverage firms.
10. It is suggested that our results might be due to a few firms which have extremely high
advertising or R&D expenditures. To test this, we eliminated firms in the pharmaceutical
industry, which have high R&D expenses, and those in the cosmetics industry, which have
above-average advertising outlays. Our results did not significantly change.
11. We also examined the possibility, suggested by Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), that a
firm's competitive environment determines both whether or not intangible investments are
undertaken, and its financial leverage. According to their model, one would expect that
firms in medium concentration industries would have greater expenditures in R&D and
advertising. Since these firms also face greater demand uncertainty, they can support less
debt. We tested the proposition that financial leverage is determined by a firm's competitive
environment by considering a model which incorporates industry concentration. We define
industry concentration in two ways. First, we compute the percentage of industry output347 Investment Patterns and Financial Leverage
produced by the four largest firms in each four-digit SIC. We also compute a second
measure, designed to reach a maximum at 50% concentration (100% concentra-
tion — concentration
2). We found that neither measure is correlated with either the type of
investment or with financial leverage and thus had no effect on the power of our model.
12. There are two methods used in accounting for investment tax credits. The flow-
through method reports the entire tax benefit in the year of purchase, so that our measure is
taken directly from each firm's income statement. The deferral method capitalizes the
benefit and amortizes it over five years. For these firms we use the income statement value
plus balance sheet changes in investment tax credit accounts.
13. We recognize the potential agency costs involved in the substitution of the same
quantity of risky projects for those with less risk and greater value. However, if more
positive valued projects are undertaken, then firm value will show a net increase. In most
cases, the underinvestment problem dominates the asset substitution problem.
14. Studies of actual bankruptcy costs find that they are quite small and increase less than
proportionally with the size of the firm. For example, see Warner (1977) and Ang, Chua,
and McConnell (1982).
15. There is a slight negative bias in our measure. We compute unsystematic risk as the
total variance of stock returns, standardized by the market variance less the square of the
stock beta. It can be shown that, all other things equal, the change in unsystematic risk with
respect to the debt-to-equity ratio is slightly negative.
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Comment Stewart C. Myers
A firm's optimal debt ratio is usually viewed as determined by a trade off
of the costs and benefits of borrowing, holding the firm's assets and
investment plans constant. The firm is portrayed as balancing the value of
interest tax shields against various costs of financial embarrassment. Of
course, there is controversy about how valuable the tax shields are and
whether the costs of financial embarrassment are material, but these give
only variations on a theme. The firm is supposed to substitute debt for
equity, or equity for debt, until the value of the firm is maximized.
Contrast this static trade-off theory with a competing popular theory,
which dates back at least to Gordon Donaldson's 1961 book, Corporate
Debt Capacity. This pecking order theory goes as follows: (1) Firms
prefer internal finance. (2) They adapt their target dividend payout ratios
to their investment requirements, although dividends are sticky and
target payout ratios are only gradually adjusted to shifts in investment
Stewart C. Myers is professor of finance at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's
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opportunities. (3) If external finance is required, firms issue the safest
security first. That is, they start with debt, then possibly hybrid securities
such as convertible bonds, then equity. (However, firms are reluctant to
issue stock if they fall into financial distress.)
I used to ignore the pecking order theory because I could think of no
theoretical foundation for it. However, recent work based on asymmet-
rical information, problems of adverse selection, moral hazard, and
signaling gives predictions roughly in line with the pecking order theory
(see, e.g., Myers and Majluf 1983).
I mention these two theories only to make my own a priori view
explicit. I believe both are operating at once. Firms are adjusting toward
a target debt ratio, reflecting the benefits and costs that the static trade-
off theory emphasizes. However, the sequence of security issues firms
make cannot be described as a smooth, gradual adjustment toward a
target ratio.
If I am right, it will be extremely difficult to take a cross-section of firms
in a particular year and obtain an accurate test of the impact of variables
which come from the static trade-off theory. Even if the tested variables
truly determine the target ratio, they may not explain the actual ratio,
because firms may take extended and erratic excursions away from the
target.
Let me now turn to the Long-Malitz paper. They started with the
hypothesis that firms borrow more against assets in place than intangibles
and growth opportunities. This hypothesis has a good theoretical founda-
tion within the static trade-off framework. They had the excellent idea of
using advertising and research and development (R&D) expenditures as
a proxy for the value of intangibles and growth opportunities.
These are likely to be robust proxies. There are relatively few problems
in measuring R&D and advertising. Moreover, tests of their effects
should be relatively insensitive to problems in measuring other things.
For example, the authors would have liked to use the replacement
instead of the book value of assets as a scaling variable for their regres-
sions. I agree, but I do not think that use of book assets undermined their
tests of the impact of advertising and R&D.
Long and Malitz conclude that asset type matters for debt policy,
holding asset risk constant. The more intangibles and growth opportuni-
ties the firm has, the lower its target debt ratio. This is an important
positive result.
1
Long and Malitz's other results are harder to interpret. Consider, for
example, the relationship between operating cash flow and capital struc-
ture. The problem is to choose a hypothesis. Long and Malitz view high
cash flow as a proxy for high profitability and the existence of valuable
growth opportunities. However, if the pecking order theory is correct,
cash flow also indicates ample internal sources of funds. Either argument350 Michael S. Long/Ileen B. Malitz
implies a negative relationship between cash flow and debt ratios. It is
therefore not clear which theory is being tested.
Long and Malitz's tax variables do not perform well, which is disturb-
ing: we would expect to find a strong tax effect in any cross-sectional
capital structure test, regardless of whose theory of "debt and taxes" you
believe in.
Figure 9.C.I plots the net tax gain from corporate borrowing against
the firm's effective marginal tax rate. In the original Modigliani-Miller
theory, which ignores personal taxes, any tax-paying corporation gains by
borrowing; the greater the marginal tax rate, the greater the gain. This
gives the top line in the figure. In Miller's (1977) paper, the personal
income taxes on interest receipts would exactly offset the corporate
interest tax shield, providing the firm paid the full 46% statutory tax rate.
However, any firm paying less than 46% would see a net tax loss to
corporate borrowing. This gives the bottom line.
Statutory
rate Net tax gain
to borrowing
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Of course, we now have compromise theories, indicated by the dashed
line in the figure (DeAngelo and Masulis 1980). But regardless of which
theory holds, the slope of the line is always positive. Therefore it is
puzzling that Long and Malitz find no cross-sectional relationship be-
tween the firm's tax status and financial leverage.
Perhaps the difficulty is finding a good proxy for "tax status." I disagree
with Long and Malitz's use of depreciation tax shields and investment tax
credits, for two reasons. First, there are many other noninterest tax
shields, for example, R&D expenditures, which can be written off im-
mediately. One could argue that investments in intangible assets are
given better treatment under our tax law than investment in tangible
assets. Second, noninterest tax shields are at best indirect measures of
unshielded income, that is, income after all deductions except interest.
This, however, can be measured directly.
However, looking at unshielded income takes us right back to looking
at operating cash flow, which consequently must play three parts: high
cash flow may indicate (1) valuable intangible assets and growth opportu-
nities, (2) ample internal sources of funds, or (3) a high demand for
interest tax shields. You cannot test three hypotheses with one variable.
Note
1. Scott H. Williamson (1981) reached the same conclusion after extensive empirical
tests. Williamson's proxy for a firm's intangibles and growth opportunities was the differ-
ence between the market value of its debt and equity securities and the replacement cost of
its tangible assets.
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